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Varying a contract in English law has many unclear aspects. The law has developed in a way 
where one principle is pitted against another. Whether it is the practical benefit rule or 
promissory estoppel against the part-payment of debt rule, or No Oral Modification (“NOM”) 
clauses against promissory estoppel. Rock Advertising v MWB Business Exchange Centres1 
considered all of these issues. The part-payment rule receives greater focus in this 
dissertation. The law is more unclear when compared to the position of NOM clauses, both 
before and after this decision. Further, promissory estoppel receives more attention as it 
affects both the part-payment rule and NOM clauses. This dissertation evaluates the state of 
promissory estoppel and the part-payment rule before this decision and it will reveal that 
Rock has left them ambiguous. It also examines the position of NOM clauses following Rock. 
Chapter 1 explains the origin of promissory estoppel and how it became significant. Its 
importance was enhanced when it was first used to undermine the part-payment rule. It will 
then be explored how its effect on the rights of promisors remains ambiguous. Its alleged 
extinctive nature undermines the part-payment rule, but it provides insight on why it is 
regarded as important. In chapter 2, the position of the part-payment rule before Rock will 
be analysed. Whilst the rule was preserved, the validity of the part-payment rule was severely 
undermined by the practical benefit rule and promissory estoppel. Chapter 3 will explore the 
reasoning of each court leading up to the Supreme Court in Rock, before evaluating the 
academic response. Interestingly, whilst the Supreme Court overruled the decision on NOM 
clauses, it appears to leave the Court of Appeal judgment on consideration intact. Its 
indication that the part-payment rule needs re-examining, combined with the Court of Appeal 
judgment, significantly doubts it. It will also be seen the Supreme Court’s ruling on NOM 
clauses contains some ambiguity. Chapter 4 will explore the effect this ruling had on the part-
payment rule; chapter 5 will explore its effect on NOM clauses. Promissory estoppel is 
addressed in both chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 4 has three main arguments: The part-payment rule is not good law; the law is trying 
to evolve towards the practical benefit rule; and promissory estoppel should be relied upon 
until this evolution. It concludes that the law underpinning the part-payment rule should be 
                                                          
1 [2018] UKSC 24 (SC) (Rock). 
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overruled. Chapter 5 will explore the arguments against the Supreme Court. It will be seen, 
however, that despite the Court of Appeal’s ruling, many still favoured and recommended 
using NOM clauses. The arguments for NOM clauses are then explored, before evaluating if 
Briggs’ approach should be preferred over Sumption’s. A key aspect to this analysis is the 
practicality of NOM clauses, therefore, this chapter draws on the opinions of legal 
practitioners alongside academics. 
Methodology 
Rock was decided in May 2018 and I commenced this dissertation the following June. Much 
of the academic discussion on the case was not released until late 2018. This impacted my 
research approach. First, I gained an overview of the law on promissory estoppel and the part-
payment rule, using textbooks Chitty on Contracts2 and Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law 
of Contract.3 It should be noted this is not the newest edition of Chitty, as the newest was 
published 24 October 2018 but did not become available to me until January 2019. However, 
the newest edition did not substantially change my research findings and only added to my 
discussion in chapter 3. These books provided key cases and issues to examine for chapters 1 
and 2. Using Lexis Nexis, I was able to access a list of cases that had considered these key 
cases. This expanded my parameters providing a firm notion of the law to write chapters 1 
and 2. However, I researched academic debate for chapter 2. Databases Westlaw and Lexis 
Nexis provided many journal articles, alongside the textbooks Furmston and Great Debates in 
Contract Law.4 Whilst writing these chapters, some articles on Rock started to release. Some 
were already in the New Law Journal, but now I had more substantive pieces to inform my 
writing at the end of chapter 3. My research developed as more articles were released at the 
end of 2018. These articles informed my analysis in chapters 4 and 5. Finally, I reference 




                                                          
2 H G Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts Volume 1, General Principles (31st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) (Chitty). 
3 M Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot, & Furmston’s Law of Contract (17th edn, OUP 2017) (Furmston). 
4 J Morgan, Great debates in contract law (2nd edn, Basingstoke 2015). 
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Chapter 1  
When forming contracts in English law, there are three important aspects: An agreement,5 
consideration, and an intention to create legal relations. A key component of English contract 
law is consideration. Consideration is not only required for forming contracts however. 
Variations of a contract also require consideration. Without it, any agreement to vary a 
contract would be unenforceable.6 Yet, some contractual variations are not supported by 
consideration, but can still have legal effects. Under the common law, such variations without 
consideration may ‘arise because the promise by a party to relinquish… his rights under a 
contract amounts to a “waiver”.’7 This approach of waiver under the common law is said to 
be less satisfactory than the approach developed in equity.8 
Equity is a concept that can be traced back to the Court of Chancery.9 This court is known for 
developing the doctrines of equity,10 it being a court of equity itself11 some of which still 
exist.12 The Court of Chancery, however, was dissolved and its function became part of the 
Chancery Division of the High Court by way of the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 
1875.13 High Court judges could now rule on what was equitable. Their decisions, however, 
                                                          
5 Of which consists of a legally valid offer and acceptance. 
6 Consideration is one of the requirements for a validly held contract: The others being offer and acceptance, an 
intention to create legal relations, capacity, and legality. For further discussion of the need for consideration to 
vary a contract see, Chitty (n 2) 342-345. 
7 Chitty (n 2) 345 at 3-081: Waiver can refer to variations supported by consideration however; for further 
discussion as to the nature of variations under the common law, see Chitty (n 2), 345-347. 
8 Ibid 347 at 3-085; the reason for the unsatisfactory common law approach is due to the distinction between 
waiver and forbearance: Chitty (n 2), 345-346 particularly the discussion at 3-084; although, there is an 
argument made to the contrary, see A J Phillips, ‘Resurrecting the doctrine of common law forbearance’ (2007) 
123 LQR 286, 313. 
9 A H Marsh, History of the Court of Chancery and of the Rise and Development of the Doctrines of Equity 
(accessible via HeinOnline, Carswell & Co 1890) 12 (Marsh); for a discussion on how the Court of Chancery first 
originated see also 6-17. 
10  Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, ‘The Chancery Division: History’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website) 
<https://www.judiciary.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/going-to-court/high-court/the-chancery-division/history-cd/> 
lasted accessed 14 December 2018. The constituent doctrines being: Estoppel by representation, see S Bower 
and Turner, Estoppel by Representation (3rd edn, LexisNexis 1977) (Bower and Turner); estoppel by convention, 
see Chitty (n 2) 367-371 at 3-107; and proprietary estoppel see Chitty (n 2) 391ff starting at 3-137. 
11 This is somewhat self-explanatory as the Court of Chancery was set up alongside the Courts of Common Law, 
see Marsh (n 9) 12-13; for reference to it as such, see also The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’ (Last updated 19 October 2018) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chancery-
Division> last accessed 14 December 2018 (Editors of Britannica). 
12 See Editors of Britannica (n 11). Although they are limited to commonwealth jurisdictions. 
13 These Acts have been repealed since. The legislation repealing the 1873 Act: the Statute Law Revision (No. 2) 
Act 1893 (repealed); the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, s.226 and sch. 6 (repealed in 
part); the Limitation Act 1939, s. 34(2) and (4) (repealed in part); the Administration of Justice Act 1965, s. 34(1) 
(repealed in part); the Rules of the Supreme Court (Revision) SI 1962/2145, sch. 5 (repealed); and the Rules of 
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were subject to the higher courts. The satisfactory approach that equity provides on 
contractual variations is promissory estoppel.   
Promissory Estoppel 
There is debate on what the true naming of this doctrine should be.14 It was first referred to 
as a ‘principle of Equity’ or a ‘relief in Equity’.15 Reference to it as an estoppel was not seen 
until Central London Property Trust v High Trees House.16 It was subsequently referred to as 
‘quasi-estoppel’ or ‘equitable estoppel’ 17  and it had various names in Tool Metal 
Manufacturing Co v Tungsten Electric Co.18 It was first called promissory estoppel in Dean v 
Bruce,19 by Lord Denning. Judicial support exists for calling it promissory estoppel, because 
“equitable” may refer to two different estoppels.20 However, its naming is still potentially 
misleading given its analogy with estoppel by representation. 21  Nevertheless, this 
dissertation will call it promissory estoppel. 22 
Promissory estoppel centres on the notions of fairness and equity in the context of 
contractual variations. The courts look to the conduct of one party and whether its effect on 
the position of the other party is inequitable. Such conduct concerns the rights and duties of 
                                                          
the Supreme Court (Revision) SI 1965/1776, sch. 2. The 1875 Act was repealed by the Supreme Court of 
Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, s. 226 and sch. 6 (repealed in part). 
14 Furmston (n 3) 135. 
15 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439 (HL) 447 (Lord Cairns LC) and 452 (Lord Selborne) 
respectively (Hughes). 
16 [1956] 1 All ER 256 (KBD) 258 and 259 (High Trees). 
17 See Combe v Combe [1951] 1 All ER 767 (CA) (Combe); also see Société Italo-Belge pour le Commerce et 
l'Industrie SA v Palm and Vegetable Oils (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (The Post Chaser) [1982] 1 All ER 19 (QBD) 25 (Goff 
J) (The Post Chaser). 
18 [1955] 2 All ER 657 (HL) 661-662 (Viscount Simonds) (Tool Metal): equitable arrangement; equitable 
principle and an equitable doctrine; see also Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayi v R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 3 All ER 
556 (PC) 559 (Lord Hodson) (Briscoe): ‘[T]he principle, which has been described as quasi estoppel and perhaps 
more aptly as promissory estoppel’.  
19 [1951] 2 All ER 926 (CA) 928 (Lord Denning): ‘I ought perhaps to explain that I was there only considering 
what is sometimes called a promissory or equitable estoppel’; see also, Durham Fancy Goods Ltd v Michael 
Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 839 (QBD) 847 (Donaldson J): ‘In my judgment the principle of equity 
upon which the promissory estoppel cases are based’; further evidence can be seen in Brikom Investments Ltd 
v Carr [1979] QB 467 (CA) 471 at 472, 477, 478 (Lord Denning), and 489-490 (Roskill LJ) (Brikom). 
20 See, Re Vandervell’s Trusts, White v Vandervell Trustees Ltd (No 2) [1974] 1 All ER 47 (ChD) 73-74 (Megarry 
J). 
21 Chitty (n 2) 361-363 at 3-103. 
22 Following many academics, for example see Bower and Turner (n 10) 383-384: ‘Lord Denning… canvassed… 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel’; see Chitty (n 2) 347 at 3-086: ‘referred to as “promissory” … estoppel’. 
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a relationship arising from a contract.23 The leading case is Hughes v Metropolitan Railway 
Co.24 
[If one party leads the other] to suppose that the… rights arising under the contract 
will not be enforced… the person who… might have enforced those rights will not be 
allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable.25  
Hughes provides a foundation for promissory estoppel. The key function is that resorting back 
to the previous contractual terms would be “inequitable” given the promisee’s reliance on 
the new promise. The doctrine hinges on this requirement for a reliance.26  
Whilst the requirements for the doctrine to apply were yet to be set in stone, what was clear 
was that where one party promised another that they would refrain from doing something, 
the promisor is prevented from reverting back to the original promise, because it would be 
inequitable given the promisee’s reliance. 27  Promissory estoppel is best explained as an 
equitable ‘forbearance’28 or ‘relief’29 from the enforcing of an original promise, because of 
the inequitable circumstances it would put the promisee in for relying on the new promise.  
The History of Promissory Estoppel 
Promissory estoppel gained much attention when the obiter of Denning J,30 in Central London 
Property Trust v High Trees House,31 appeared to question the part-payment of debt rule.32 
Controversy stemmed from the fact that this rule came from the House of Lords. Its notoriety 
for questioning the highest court in the land is clear from subsequent reaction to it. It was 
                                                          
23 E Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 119, para. 3-077 (Treitel). 
24 Hughes (n 15). 
25 Ibid 448. 
26 See chapter 4 of this dissertation argues the requirement for reliance should necessitate the existence of a 
detriment.  
27 The common example is, of course, not to enforce their existing contractual agreement, however there are 
other instances of this doctrine in effect. See the example given in J Glister, ‘Twinsectra v Yardley: trusts, powers 
and contractual obligations’ (2002) 4 TL 223, 229: ‘If a borrower relies to his detriment on a lender's contractual 
promise not to revoke the borrower's licence, and the lender does so revoke, then a promissory estoppel may 
arise.’ 
28 As per the sub-heading title choice of words in Chitty (n 2) 347 at 3-085. 
29 As per the submissions of Mr Southgate QC and Mr Bowen, on behalf of the appellant, in Hughes (n 15).  
30 As he then was; he later became a Lord Justice of Appeal and then the Master of the Rolls. 
31 High Trees (n 16). 
32 This principle is discussed at length in chapter two. It is not this chapter’s scope to analyse the principle. 
9  
named amongst the fifteen most important cases in the last 150 years.33 It was described as 
a ‘ground-breaking ruling’.34 However, its validity is open to debate. 
In Combe v Combe,35 Asquith LJ thought ‘[i]t… unnecessary to express any view as to [its] 
correctness.’36 He remained neutral on whether it was good law.37 However, overall Combe 
seemed to regard High Trees as good law, albeit, most of this treatment came from Denning.38 
It has been applied in many cases since,39 most notably in The Post Chaser.40 Denning was 
described as ‘breath[ing] new life into… [promissory] estoppel.’41 His obiter was welcomed 
and, arguably, became good law in Collier v P & MJ Wright.42 It was described as ‘brilliant’ by 
Arden LJ.43 Clearly, what began as no more than a mere principle of equity now has a firm 
basis in contract law. Yet, much is to be said about it still. Lord Hailsham LC stated: 
 
The time may soon come when the whole sequence of cases… on promissory 
estoppel…, beginning with High Trees, may need to be review[ed]… I do not mean to 
say that any are to be regarded with suspicion. But as is common with an expanding 
doctrine they do raise problems of coherent exposition which have never been 
systematically explored.44 
                                                          
33 As of 2015. See, Lord Neuberger, ‘Reflections on the ICLR Top Fifteen Cases: A Talk to Commemorate the ICLR’s 
150th Anniversary’ (6 October 2015), para. 9, available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
151006.pdf>.  
34 G Bindman, ‘A Rare Judge’ (2018) 168 New Law Journal 22; he may, however, have drawn inspiration from 
earlier case law indicating he was not as bold and controversial as would seem, see M Hughes, ‘Contracts, 
Consideration and Third Parties’ 3 JIBFL 79 where Hughes indicated Denning may have drawn inspiration from 
Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] 2 KB 330 (CA): ‘[it was a] short step from [this case] to the concept of 
promissory estoppel in High Trees.’ 
35 Combe (n 17). 
36 Ibid 225. 
37 See also his subsequent remarks that the case does not help the plaintiff at ibid: ‘But assuming, without 
deciding, that it is good law, I do not think, however, that it helps the plaintiff at all.’ 
38 Who, of course, also presided over High Trees; see, Combe (n 24) 769 (Denning LJ): ‘… I am inclined to favour 
the principle stated in the High Trees case…’ 
39  See: Re Wyvern Developments Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1097 (Ch); Argy Trading Development Co Ltd v Lapid 
Developments Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 785 (QBD); Brikom (n 19); Syros Shipping Co SA v Elaghill Trading Co (The 
Proodos) [1981] 3 All ER 189 (QBD); Smith v Lawson [1997] NPC 87 (CA); it also received application outside 
England and Wales, see the case of the India Supreme Court State of Arunachal Pradesh v Nezone Law House 
[2008] INSC 553 (SC of India); and, most recently Dunbar Assets plc v Butler [2015] EWHC 2546 (Ch).  
40 The Post Chaser (n 17).  
41 Ibid 27 (Goff J). 
42 [2008] 1 WLR 643 (CA) (Collier). 
43 Ibid, para. 42. 
44 Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741 (HL) 758; the validity 
of these words in even more apparent after the discussion in chapter 5. 
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The appraisal of High Trees come from no higher than the Court of Appeal; whereas, the 
principle High Trees doubted has authority in the House of Lords. 45  Hailsham provides 
valuable insight to the standing of High Trees. No doubt it is a doctrine to be welcomed, but 
its expansion has introduced uncertainty to other areas of law, 46  alongside casting 
uncertainty on its own effect. 
The Effect of Promissory Estoppel 
It could be questioned whether promissory estoppel prevents the promisor from reviving 
their original rights forever, or whether it merely prevents them for a conditional period of 
time. The importance of this question is seen if it is forever, meaning the doctrine is extinctive. 
If it extinguishes rights and does not suspend them, it potentially undermines the part-
payment rule.47  
Denning thought promissory estoppel extinguished rights.48 Whilst holding this belief, it was 
clear from High Trees that the doctrine only suspended the landlord’s right to rent. It was 
suspensory because the conditions on which the promise was made, those which estopped 
the landlord,49 had ceased to exist. The parties found themselves in the same position before 
the promise was made. Similar was stated long before High Trees by Bowen LJ in Birmingham 
and District Land Co. v London and North Western Railway Co:50 
The truth is that the proposition [in Hughes] is wider than cases of forfeiture… [I]f 
persons [meet Hughes] those persons will not be allowed… to enforce the rights until 
such time has elapsed, without at all events placing the parties in the same position 
as they were before.51 
When a new promise is made in light of events placing the promisee in a different position, if 
they cease to exist, then the right to rely on the new promise ceases too. Denning appears to 
mean the doctrine is extinctive if certain circumstances prevail. This is simply another way of 
saying the doctrine is suspensory. The doctrine can suspend indefinitely, if the circumstances 
                                                          
45 Discussion as to which way the law ought to reflect is seen in chapter two. 
46 As seen in chapter 2 and 5. 
47 That which is already mentioned in the above discussion on High Trees (n 16). 
48 High Trees (n 16) 259; he repeated this view, in D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617 (CA). 
49 I.e., the war-time conditions, see High Trees (n 16) 259. 
50 (1888) All ER 620 (CA). 
51 Ibid, at pg. 268. 
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prevail indefinitely. Ogilvy v Hope-Davies, 52  however, supports the extinctive side to 
promissory estoppel in which it was held that ‘withdrawal of the waiver was impossible’.53 
The same is clear in Brikom Investments v Carr.54 Treitel argues that the right in this case was 
extinguished because the variation prevented the landlord’s right to compel the tenants to 
contribute to the costs of repairs.55 It is submitted these decisions are irrelevant, as they are 
cases of waiver.56 Arden made it clear that ‘[it] has the effect of extinguishing’.57 However, it 
is submitted the rights would and should only be extinguished to the extent that the 
inequitable circumstances prevail. 
The case for it being suspensory has greater backing from the House of Lords. In Tool Metal,58 
it was seen that the original rights could be resumed given that a reasonable notice was 
provided.59 Similar was held in Banning v Wright.60 The doctrine was stated as suspensory 
when the promisee can resume their original position.61 This fits perfectly with Denning’s 
judgment, as if the parties cannot resume their original position arguably the inequitable 
conditions prevail. Snell’s Equity provides insight: 
The effect of the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be either [suspensory] or 
[extinctive]. But it is usually [suspensory]. [T]he promise will only become final and 
irrevocable if [the promisee] cannot resume his… former position. In this sense… 
promissory estoppel has much in common with the principle of waiver… which 
permits a party to revoke any waiver upon reasonable notice to the other party.62 
Attempts have been made to construe the doctrine in a flexible manner. Promissory estoppel, 
at the least, suspends rights from being enforced where the promisee cannot resort back to 
their original position. Conditions creating this position are the inequitable circumstances to 
                                                          
52 [1976] 1 All ER 683 (ChD). 
53 Ibid, 689. 
54 Brikom (n 19). 
55 Treitel (n 23), 150-151, see his discussion at 3-115 on pgs 150-151. 
56 Ibid; see also, Brikom (n 19) 48: ‘there was a plain waiver by the landlords…’ where Roskill LJ considers as such 
and he does not resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, see Brikom (n 19). 
57 Ibid, para. 42. 
58 Tool Metal (n 18). 
59 As per Tungsten Electric Co Ltd and Tungsten Industrial Products Ltd v Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd (1954) 
71 RPC 273 (QBD) (Delvin J), which Lord Cohen refers to, see Tool Metal (n 18) 681. 
60 [1972] 2 All ER 987 (HL) 991ff. 
61 See, Briscoe (n 18); in other words, the doctrine is effective until the inequitable conditions no longer persist. 
62 J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010), para. 12-014. 
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which promissory estoppel applies. 63  However, it is submitted the law should distance 
promissory estoppel from cases of waiver, so it avoids the decisions of Ogilvy and Brikom. 
After all, promissory estoppel was developed as a more satisfactory approach than that of 
waiver to contractual variations. Despite the suggestion in Snell’s Equity and the ruling of 
Collier, the law should simply resolve that promissory estoppel is suspensory. It can be 
suspensory for a long time thus achieving the extinctive aspect. Describing it as extinctive, 
however, has only led to confusion. This is desirable because, ironically, it introduces an 
equitable outcome to the promisor by allowing the restoration of the original agreement 
when the new one is too favourable to the promisee. An extinctive effect would open 
promissory estoppel to exploitation. 
The Significance of Promissory Estoppel 
One significant aspect is that it is a shield and not a sword:64 It is a defence only. The other 
aspect is its effect. The significance arises from the shifted focus of the doctrine on to the 
part-payment rule; of which High Trees questioned. Contrary to the position taken in this 
dissertation, Arden stated the doctrine extinguished the creditor’s right and cited the obiter 
of Denning.65 If it can be taken to extinguish a creditor’s right to the full debt, this potentially 










                                                          
63 Ibid: The prevailing war-time conditions made it inequitable to revert back to the original agreement. 
64 Combe (n 17) 772. 
65 Ibid, 659 at para. 42. 
66 Pinnel’s Case, sub nom Penny v Core [1558-1774] All ER Rep 612 (Court of Common Pleas) (Pinnel’s). 
67 (1884) 9 App Cas 605 (HL) (Foakes). 
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Chapter 2 
The part-payment of debt rule may seem like an ordinary legal principle, justifying its 
transition to becoming obsolete as a mere part of legal evolution.68 It was seen how Central 
London Property Trust v High Trees House69 may facilitate this. However, the year of Collier v 
P & MJ Wright (Holdings),70 frames the part-payment rule in greater importance and attaches 
more weighting to it over other legal principles. In 2008, western economies faced financial 
crisis. If a decision in Collier favoured debtors, undermining the part-payment rule, it would 
attract controversy and attention because it would discourage creditors from lending. 
Creditors would lose the full amount owed when accepting any lesser amount; which during 
the crisis would have been appropriate for commercial reasons.71 Any decision impacting 
creditors and the economy during economic recession would therefore follow the part-
payment rule, as Collier did. The part-payment rule is more important than the average legal 
principle. However, it will be seen that its economic role has led to the adoption of a harsh 
principle, alongside the oversight of the reasoning behind it in Pinnel’s Case.72 
In Pinnel’s, an action of debt was brought by Pinnel against Cole. The debt was on a bond of 
£16, which was conditional for the payment of £8. Cole argued Pinnel had accepted payment 
of £5 in full satisfaction of the £8. When faced with the proposition that the payment of 
smaller sum can be satisfactory to a creditor for the whole debt, Lord Coke created the part-
payment rule: ‘[P]ayment of a lesser sum… cannot be a satisfaction for the whole, because it 
appears to the judges that by no possibility a lesser sum can be a satisfaction… for a greater 
sum.’73 However, the reasoning behind this can be questioned, as will be seen. There are 
three exceptions to this rule. The gifting of a ‘horse, hawk, or robe [can be satisfactory]’,74 the 
                                                          
68 This is prevalent in other disciplines. Consider the concept of mens rea in criminal law. Its evolution has gone 
from considering the subjective standpoint of the defendant to disregarding this and considering the objective 
standards of society. See the overruling of R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (CA) (which concerns subjectivity) in Ivey v 
Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67 (SC) (Ivey). 
69 High Trees (n 16) 258 and 259. 
70 Collier (n 42). 
71 Those reasons being that it is commercially viable, at least in the housing context, to accept a lesser payment 
of rent than to forfeit a tenant and seek a new one; see also M Byrne ‘Estoppel and Rent Reductions: What are 
the implications of rent reductions in order to retain valued tenants during the economic downturn? – Issues to 
Consider’ (2014) 19(1) CPLJ 9. 
72 Pinnel’s (n 66). 
73 Pinnel’s (n 66). 
74 Pinnel’s (n 66). 
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reasoning being anything other than money ‘might be more beneficial’.75 A smaller payment 
made before the day it is due can be satisfactory and payment at a different location than 
that initially agreed upon is also satisfactory.76 The latter has not aged well however. During 
the 1600s, it was common for debt payments to be made at a specified location, however, 
now for obvious reasons this is obsolete.  
Cole had merely claimed he made a smaller payment in general and that Pinnel had accepted 
it as satisfactory. Irrespective of whether Pinnel had done that, this did not prevent him from 
claiming for the remaining amount, because Cole did not fall within any of the exceptions. 
Therefore, Pinnel was entitled to recover the entire amount. Two centuries later this principle 
was enshrined in the law. 
The House of Lords, in Foakes v Beer,77 affirmed Pinnel’s. Foakes owed Beer approximately 
£2090. Foakes requested that Beer give him time to pay the debt and it was agreed that 
Foakes would pay £500 as part-satisfaction of the £209078 and Beer undertook to not take 
proceedings. Beer, however, claimed interest on the debt. The court of first instance found in 
favour of Foakes, finding that by reason of the agreement Beer was not entitled to claim 
interest. The Court of Appeal overruled this due to the lack of consideration. Beer was free to 
claim interest. However, the initial £500 could have constituted consideration and, in the 
House of Lords, Lord Blackburn recognised this because a ‘prompt payment… may be more 
beneficial to them than… enforc[ing] payment of the whole.’79 Despite this, he upheld the 
Court of Appeal’s decision. The £500 was not sufficient consideration. Foakes affirmed that a 
part-payment cannot be satisfactory of a whole debt. But it is worth examining its reasoning. 
The Validity of Foakes v Beer 
Through critique of Foakes, there is critique of Pinnel’s. The most prominent issue is that the 
rule is harsh. This is clear when comparing the position of a creditor to a debtor in the context 
of a leasing; the creditor clearly has the advantageous position. A debtor has two options. 
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79 Foakes (n 67). 
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They can make a part-payment, but risk the creditor asking for the rest. Or they can incur 
arrears and risk falling behind on future payments. They also risk losing their occupational 
rights. It is potentially a lose-lose situation. On the other hand, the creditor can profit from 
both scenarios. If the debtor makes a part-payment, the creditor, knowing they cannot pay 
the rest without financial setbacks elsewhere, can profit by pursuing arrears on the amount 
outstanding. They could go a step further and seek reoccupation. Even if a part-payment is 
not made, they still benefit since they can pursue arrears and reoccupation. Ferson argues 
‘[Foakes] is not only… absurd but it is inconvenient in commercial dealings, and… distasteful 
to the courts.’80 This explains why Roberts believes ‘many may be uncomfortable… follow[ing] 
Foakes’.81 This uncomfortableness exists beyond English law too. US law has a rule similar to 
Foakes.82 US case law has expressed the rule as unjust and oppressive.83 Further, Ames states 
that the rule adopts a narrow definition of consideration.84 It is no wonder why Blackburn 
recognised a ‘prompt payment may be more beneficial’.85  The problematic nature of the rule 
can be traced back to Pinnel’s.  
Coke’s reasoning for the part-payment rule was that ‘it appears to the Judges that by no 
possibility, a lesser sum can be [satisfactory for]… a greater sum.’86 Coke might be indicating 
that it cannot be satisfactory for a particular reason. But it appears instead that he is stating 
the law is a particular way, because it appears to be so. Simply stating the law is a certain way, 
because it appears ‘by no possibility’87 that it could not be any other way is not convincing. It 
would be similar to a judge claiming a defendant should be acquitted for his crime, because 
it appears to be the case to the judge without giving specific reasons. The reasoning is based 
on subjectivity, rather than objectivity and public policy consideration. Therefore, whilst Coke 
likely had the issue of debt satisfaction in mind, it can only be assumed with certainty that his 
                                                          
80 M L Ferson, ‘The Rule In Foakes v Beer’ (1921) 31(1) Yale Law Journal 15 (Ferson). 
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84 J B Ames, ‘Two Theories of Consideration’ (1899) 12 Harvard Law Review 515, 521. 
85 Foakes (n 67) 622. 
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reasoning is that a part-payment is not satisfactory because it seems to be so. Perhaps Coke 
thought no benefit could be derived. Blackburn, however, states that ‘Coke made a mistake 
of fact’88 and refers to a situation where the creditor does stand to benefit from a part-
payment. The Lords in Foakes, appear to only follow Coke’s reasoning out of respect.  
Coke is no doubt an esteemed judge, but this renders the reasoning of Foakes potentially 
fallacious. Lord Watson states ‘I do not think it… open to this House… to overrule Pinnel’s, 
because I am not prepared to disturb that doctrine.’89 Lord Fitzgerald admits ‘it would have 
been wiser… if the resolution in Pinnel’s had never been come to’,90 but because it has been 
‘accepted… for a great length of time… it is not now within our province to overturn it.’91 
Blackburn considered dissenting, but did not because it ‘was not satisfactory to the other 
noble and learned Lords’.92 The majority of the Lords’ reasoning to follow Pinnel’s is based on 
the fact they did not wish to disturb the rule or because it has been accepted for a long time. 
In Blackburn’s case, it is because his fellow Lords think these things. These two reasons are 
founded on respect for Coke, but this simply means it is an appeal to authority fallacy. Pinnel’s 
is only affirmed because it was devised by Coke, despite its unconvincing nature. Many cases, 
of course, are settled by appealing to an authority. This is the nature of case law; however, 
other reasons exist alongside it. The Lords rely on Coke’s reasoning alone. Coke’s reasoning is 
not convincing and the Lords in Foakes knew this, evident in the hesitancy of Blackburn and 
the fact Fitzgerald thought it was wiser it had not been come to. Nevertheless, out of respect 
for Coke, they followed it. Even the academic Burton, who supports Foakes, recognises this: 
‘the core argument was that… Pinnel’s ought not to be disturbed due to its history’.93 This 
legal principle is undesirable. Not only is it harsh, but its initial reasoning is unconvincing and 
its affirmation is based on a fallacy. 
It makes sense then why the unanimous reasoning in Foakes was ignored in Williams v Roffey 
Bros94 and why it did not prevent Denning from curtailing its authority in High Trees.95  
                                                          
88 Foakes (n 67) 617. 
89 Foakes (n 67) 623-624. 
90 Foakes (n 67) 630. 
91 Foakes (n 67) 630; Fitzgerald refers to the fact it has been adopted for 282 years, Foakes 629. 
92 Foakes (n 67) 623. 
93 M Burton, ‘Practical benefit rides again: MWB business exchange in comparative perspective’ (2017) 46(1) 
Common Law World Review 69, 73 (Burton). 
94 [1991] 1 QB 1 (CA) (Williams). 
95 See chapter 1 on the discussion of High Trees. 
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The Practical Benefit Rule 
Performance of an existing contractual duty is generally insufficient consideration for a 
promise. Stilk v Myrick96 held that a promise to pay sailors extra wages for the performance 
of their ‘ordinary [duty] in navigating the ship’ cannot be enforced.97 Making it enforceable 
would allow a promisee in any situation to underperform their role to the promisor’s 
detriment, unless they agreed to pay them more. Such performance was sufficient in Hartley 
v Ponsonby. 98  Performance was dangerous to their lives, thus exceeding their original 
contractual duty and constituting consideration.99 Williams v Roffey Bros100 introduces the 
concept of a practical benefit. 
Glidewell LJ stated consideration can exist for the promise of an additional payment to 
perform existing contractual duties, where a practical benefit is obtained by the promisor or 
they avoid a detriment.101 Where the promisor has received any form of benefit from the 
completion of the contract, consideration exists for the new promise to pay more. Completion 
of the contract may seem insufficient and problematic, given that the promisee could simply 
underperform to ransom for more money, as warned in Stilk. Glidewell rebuts this possibility 
by requiring the absence of economic duress.102 He considered that Stilk and its tie to the 
Napoleonic wars necessitated its refinement and limitation via the practical benefit rule.103 
Russel LJ added that the rigidity found in Stilk is no longer necessary or desirable.104 Knight is 
critical of the practical benefit rule, however, because of its consideration of Stilk. He claims 
there is a real danger this rule imports an intention that simply was not there.105 In particular, 
the practical difference between Williams and Stilk is negligible. In Williams, it was the 
performance of a contract, which is exactly what happened in Stilk.106 Such performance was 
allowed in Harris v Watson,107 but Knight states the seaman in Harris were not performing 
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what they were contracted to do, hence why it distinguished from Stilk.108 Nevertheless, it 
was within the remit of Williams to limit its application. 109 This criticism is weaker than 
Knight’s other point. 
The most powerful argument against the practical benefit rule, Knight argues, is that it 
damages the fundamental idea of contract. One should perform what they agreed or be made 
to pay for it. Being awarded something for doing what was already agreed runs contrary to 
the bargain principle, Knight argues. 110 However, Knight is missing the fact that another 
fundamental idea of contract is that parties are free to renegotiate their contracts. This aspect 
is more desirable, because circumstances can change quickly. Kane convincingly states there 
are economic reasons for settling a debt for less than its face value. 111   It enables the 
avoidance of statutory proceedings. 112  Whilst this is important, Kane argues it is not 
economically optimal, as it leads to companies going into administration which decreases 
productivity. 113  He continues that the law should accommodate transactions that are 
mutually beneficial, because it accords to an important economic principle.114 This argument 
makes commercial sense. Kane’s alternative undermines Knight. A practical benefit should 
apply to a part-payment of a debt, enabling consideration to be found. The courts have done 
this, indirectly, at the expense of casting more doubt on Foakes.115 The law should depart 
from Foakes completely, as opposed to casting more doubt on it. 
There is support for Williams. Furmston welcomes the decision, arguing there are good 
commercial reasons to promise more money to ensure performance; finding a new, reliable 
party is harder and less sensible than maintaining a current one.116 Yet, equally it seems 
Foakes prevails. A High Court case117 suggested Williams is inconsistent with the principle that 
consideration must move from the promisee.118 Further, Williams did not refer to Foakes. It 
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can be argued it would be unconvincing to extend the practical benefit rule to the part-
payment rule. To do so is directly contrary to Foakes. It is no surprise then, that in Re 
Selectmove119 a differently constituted Court of Appeal held that it is ‘impossible to extend… 
Williams to any circumstances governed by [Foakes].’ 120  ‘It would in effect leave the 
principle… without any application.’121 Whilst Williams has been held to not concern the part-
payment of debts, it extremely doubts Foakes. The fact a Court of Appeal decision can 
undermine a House of Lords ruling, albeit indirectly,122 indicates problems with Foakes like 
those explored. Until 2018, the part-payment rule remained perfectly intact through 
Selectmove. 
Promissory Estoppel 
In High Trees, Denning notes how Foakes had not considered Hughes v Metropolitan Railway 
Co.123 This is also recognised in Collier.124 It could be argued Foakes is per incuriam for this 
reason. However, it concerned debts whilst Hughes concerned house repairs. Further, this 
argument is difficult, because Lord Selborne and Blackburn both sat on Hughes and Foakes. 
These decisions can exist side by side as expressed in Collier; promissory estoppel would be 
an exception.125 The promissory estoppel cases instead show that Foakes is undesirable. The 
rule was created in the 1602 and, in 1937, the Sixth Interim Report of the Law Revision 
Committee expressed the principle must be reconsidered.126 This was recognised by Denning 
10 years later in High Trees127 where its effect was considered. It was submitted it only 
suspends rights.128 Promissory estoppel therefore is only a partial answer. However, it does 
‘provide a way out of the culde-sac created by Foakes.’129  
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The Position Now 
The effect of promissory estoppel makes the part-payment rule seem like an ordinary legal 
principle and this should be welcomed. Foakes has faced similar testing in Williams, but it 
appears intact through Selectmove. Perhaps the ambiguity surrounding it is its last armour. 
An opportunity to the remove this ambiguity was presented to the Supreme Court in Rock 
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Chapter 3 
Rock Advertising v MWB Business Exchange Centres131 ruled on two fundamental issues of 
contract law.132 It considered No Oral Modification (“NOM”) clauses and the tension between 
the part-payment of debt rule and the practical benefit rule. The practical benefit rule had 
never reached the Supreme Court until Rock.133 ‘The decision was… eagerly awaited [as] it… 
provide[d] the opportunity for the law to be clarified… [however,] the Court decided the case 
on other grounds.’ 134  These other grounds being on NOM clauses. Interestingly, the 
consideration point was discussed at length by the Court of Appeal in MWB Business Exchange 
Centres v Rock Advertising.135 These two issues are complicated. However, ironically, the facts 
of the case ‘are straightforward.’136  
MWB137 had an office space and rented a suite to Rock.138 The terms of the licence gave Rock 
occupation for a fixed term of 12 months starting on 1 November 2011 and Rock was to pay 
a fee of £3500 per month for the first three months. After that, they were to pay £4,333.44 
for the remaining months. By February 2012, Rock had accumulated arrears exceeding 
£12,000. Rock proposed to MWB a revised schedule of payments, which meant MWB 
received payment that would be worth slightly less: It would be a part-payment of a debt. 
Rock and MWB had further telephone discussions. Rock claimed MWB had agreed to vary the 
licence according to its proposal during these discussions. MWB rejected this and stated they 
treated it as ‘a proposal in a continuing negotiation’.139 Higher management in MWB later 
rejected the proposal. The key issue is that the alleged agreement took place orally. Clause 
7.6 of the licence agreement contained a NOM clause.140 
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It required that any changes to the licence must be made in writing and signed by both parties. 
Its purpose is to prevent any changes being made orally. MWB contended no valid oral 
variation had been made, because of clause 7.6. MWB later locked Rock out of the premises 
due to its arrears. Subsequently, it terminated the licence and pursued the arrears, but Rock 
counterclaimed for wrongful exclusion.141 Both claims depended on whether the agreement 
was legally effective,142 which depended on three issues. 
The first concerned NOM clauses. Rock relied on the principle of party autonomy.143 Despite 
the NOM clause, parties are free to vary orally with each other’s consent. They relied on the 
judgment that courts are not always required to give effect to a contractual term which 
specifies a particular format of variation, as in World Online Telecom v I-Way.144 MWB relied 
on United Bank v Asif. 145  The parties must have shown that the oral agreement was 
inconsistent with the original licence and that they also agreed to waive the requirement for 
a variation to be in writing. This second aspect was missing.146 They made further arguments 
against Globe Motors Inc v TRW LucasVarity Electric Steering,147 which favoured Rock’s case.  
The second was the consideration point. Rock argued that the new agreement brought 
practical advantages to MWB, therefore it was supported by consideration.148 On the other 
hand, MWB contended there could be no consideration, because of the rule in Foakes v 
Beer.149 
Arguments were also made in relation to promissory estoppel.150 These arguments attach 
onto both the first and second issues. It was used as a defence to the assertion of a NOM 
clause and the part-payment rule. However, each court found that Rock could not claim this 
defence as they took only ‘minimal steps’151 and Rock could not say it ‘suffered any prejudice 
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by relying [on the agreement].’152 This doctrine formed a more integral part of the two lower 
courts’ discussions; the Supreme Court’s ruling depended on NOM clauses and small 
discussion was given to consideration and estoppel.153  
County Court 
Judge Moloney found in favour of MWB. Interestingly, he ruled the variation agreement was 
supported by consideration, as MWB had the practical benefit of the increased prospect of 
eventually being paid.154 This goes against Foakes and favours Rock, as the oral agreement 
was legally effective. However, Moloney also ruled that the NOM clause was effective. 
Therefore, the variation was ineffective, because it was not recorded in writing.155 Whilst 
there was consideration, there was also a legally effective NOM clause. 
Court of Appeal 
On appeal, the case was decided in Rock’s favour. Kitchin LJ gave the leading judgment on the 
NOM clause issue. Kitchin, with whom McCombe LJ agrees, and Arden LJ led the discussion in 
relation to the consideration point. 
NOM Clauses 
Kitchin states how the law on NOM clauses is uncertain.156 It was caused by the opposing 
cases United Bank and World Online. United Bank found that NOM clauses were effective;157 
World Online found the law was unsettled, but nevertheless was against NOM clauses.158 
Both of these cases, Kitchin notes, were considered in Globe Motors. At first instance, it was 
decided that it was possible to orally vary the agreement in that case, despite the existence 
of a NOM clause.159 Party autonomy enabled this. On appeal, Globe Motors found that the 
issue surrounding the NOM clause was unnecessary to the case due to an error from the trial 
                                                          
152 MWB (n 135) 63. 
153 See Rock (n 1) 16 and 18. 
154 Rock (n 1) 4. 
155 Rock (n 1) 4. 
156 MWB (n 135) 611. 
157 United (n 145). 
158 Ibid. 
159 Globe (n 144). 
24  
judge.160 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal expressed their views on it and favoured party 
autonomy over NOM clauses.  
Beatson LJ main reason focused on the existing authorities, namely United Bank and World 
Online. Drawing on Australian authority, Beatson considered World Online good law for oral 
variations despite NOM clauses.161 However, in World Online there was room for debate and 
it did not consider United Bank. The fact United Bank was unreported might explain this 
however. Beatson acknowledges this in his third reason concerning precedent, that he was 
not bound by either case. Although they were inconsistent with each other, he preferred 
World Online.162 Underhill LJ appeared hesitant on this issue, but nevertheless agreed with 
Beatson’s reasons.163 Moore-Bick LJ also agreed, but likened the principle of freedom of 
contract to Parliament being unable to bind its successors.164 This analogy is problematic. It 
is true Parliament cannot bind its successors, but the way it departs from them follows a set 
procedure: One analogous with NOM clauses. Generally, Parliament must undo an Act in the 
same way it made it, through creating a repealing Act. NOM clauses achieve the same thing. 
They recognise the agreement does not bind the parties’ future selves, but to depart from an 
aspect of the contract they have to follow a set procedure like Parliament.  
Globe Motors influenced Kitchin165 and held World Online to be the correct statement of the 
law. Party autonomy was cited in a New York case166 and this reinforced Kitchin’s decision 
that the NOM clause was not effective. Arden agreed. The reasons of Kitchin are logical, but 
his reliance on Globe Motors, which relied on World Online, is dubious. World Online 
overlooked United Bank; if it had not, it may have decided in favour of NOM clauses which 
would have reversed the decisions of Globe Motors and consequently Kitchin in MWB. 
Consideration 
Kitchin and Arden agree on this point too. Kitchin argued there was ‘a commercial advantage 
to both MWB and Rock’.167 MWB received several practical benefits: They would recover 
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£3500 immediately; Rock would remain as a licensee, so they would not need to seek a new 
one;168 and, it would be likely to recover more from Rock than if it enforced the terms of the 
agreement.169 Kitchin stated the benefits ‘conferred on MWB… were [not all] benefits of a 
kind contemplated… in Foakes and in Re Selectmove.’ 170 Therefore, it was a case where 
Williams v Roffey Bros171 applied. Kitchin held the immediate payment of £3500 and the 
agreement to perform its future obligations conferred this benefit. Arden also found the 
agreement to perform the existing obligation constituted consideration. This seems contrary 
to Stilk v Myrick,172 which found performance of an existing contractual obligation does not 
constitute valid consideration. However, they applied Williams, which limited and refined 
Stilk.173 Arden continues by drawing support from other cases considered in Williams174 and 
also draws support from Chitty.175 However, the newest edition states Foakes is binding on 
the lower courts.176  
Arden reasoned MWB did not have to find a new occupant, which meant they were ‘avoiding 
the void’177 of an unoccupied property. Her second reason was more unexpected however. It 
should be noted this is not the first time Arden has addressed the part-payment issue. She 
also addressed it in Collier v Wright.178 In MWB, Arden follows the part-payment rule, but 
tweaks it slightly. In chapter 2, it was seen that an exception to it is ‘a gift of a horse, hawk or 
robe’.179 Corpn of Drogheda v Fairtclough,180 stated a hawk ‘is no different from the conferral 
of an [sic] benefit or advantage’.181 Arden notes how Foakes approves Drogheda.182 Arden 
therefore ‘replac[ed] the words “the gift of a horse, hawk or robe” with a more modern 
equivalent in line with [Williams]’.183 This refined and limited the common law but left ‘the 
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principle… in Pinnel's unscathed.’ 184  She stated her judgment may create a satisfactory 
balance between creditors and debtors.185 However, both of her reasons could be inflicted 
with bias against the part-payment rule. She was very favourable of Denning,186 whose obiter 
she described as ‘brilliant’.187 Also, as will be seen in chapter 4, her tweaking of Pinnel’s seems 
forced. Perhaps the reason for Arden’s bias relates to her previous writings. The part-payment 
rule is traditional and Arden has written on how the law should keep up with social change.188 
Evidently, she would view the part-payment rule unfavourably. This is not to say her 
background detracts from her given reasons, but it does explain why her judgment in MWB 
is influenced by Denning. The Court of Appeal found there was consideration and no legally 
effective NOM clause. The Supreme Court, however, did not decide the case on the 
consideration point.  
Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court found, in favour of MWB, that the NOM clause was legally effective, 
overruling the Court of Appeal on this point. Whether or not they overruled the Court of 
Appeal’s decision on the consideration point is unclear, as they did not deal with 
consideration.189 
NOM Clauses 
Lord Sumption states there is longstanding support for NOM clauses in other jurisdictions, 
such as New York,190 Australia,191 and Canada.192 However, he recognised how English law is 
‘equivocal’.193 In addition to World Online, other cases indicated ‘that such clauses were 
ineffective.’194 Sumption referred to only United Bank as case law in support of NOM clauses. 
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He combined this unreported case with the cases from alternative jurisdictions and ‘the 
substantial body of… academic writing in support[ing] [NOM] clauses.’195 Sumption stated 
‘the law… does give effect to [NOM clauses].’196 The counter-argument of party autonomy is 
a fallacy.197 True party autonomy is to decide how they bind themselves; trying to assert party 
autonomy is the real offence to that principle.198 Sumption states NOM clauses are logical 
and he disregards the argument that NOM clauses are conceptually impossible.199 
The position that NOM clauses are conceptually impossible puts forward that parties agreeing 
to not vary their contract orally is impossible, because such an agreement would 
automatically be destroyed upon agreeing as such.200 This is not the case Sumption argues, 
as apparent in international law and opinions.201 Further, this argument overlooks the fact 
that the agreement to not orally vary the contract could have been made in writing, thus 
agreeing upon it would not destroy itself. It is logical to have NOM clauses, because it prevents 
any attempt to undermine a written agreement by raising a defence of a summary judgment; 
further, oral discussions can easily give rise to misunderstandings. 202  For example, Rock 
believed MWB had agreed to his schedule, whereas MWB claimed they had not accepted it. 
Oral variations are not alone. Oral formations also have issues in contract law. Denning, in 
Entores v Miles Far East Corporation,203 highlights the ambiguity in forming a contract orally. 
It might not be known when the contract was formed, since an aircraft flying overhead might 
drown the person’s acceptance to form the contract.204 It is clear why Sumption states ‘oral 
discussions can easily give rise to misunderstandings’.205 NOM clauses also allow corporations 
to better police its internal rules on who can make such variations, as they would be recorded 
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in writing.206 All of these are clearly logical and are also ‘legitimate commercial reasons’207 for 
upholding NOM clauses. 
Sumption continues that the assertion the oral variation intended to dispense with the NOM 
clause does not seem to follow.208 The first logical inference to be drawn is that the parties 
simply overlooked it, 209  which makes sense given the usual density of contractual 
agreements. Further, in practice, parties rarely consult the contract prior to making a business 
move. They may consult a lawyer, if they thought an issue was apparent. No doubt this case 
will make future lawyers emphasise the meaning of NOM clauses to their clients. The second 
inference is that the parties who did know about the NOM clause ‘court[ed] invalidity with… 
open eyes.’210 This makes sense, because ‘it is not difficult to record a variation in writing’211 
therefore it does not inhibit commercial practice. However, Lord Briggs differs and argues 
that NOM clauses can be orally dispensed with if the parties acknowledge it. Nevertheless, 
Sumption’s view is the law. 
NOM clauses could result in a party acting on an invalid variation and Sumption notes how 
estoppel is a safeguard against this. 212  However, estoppel did not require any further 
discussion, as Rock did not meet the minimal requirements to rely on an estoppel defence.213 
Sumption gave a similar length of discussion to consideration, but it had greater ramifications. 
Consideration 
This forms the controversial part of the Supreme Court’s judgment. ‘[T]he decision was… 
eagerly awaited’,214 as it was the opportune moment to provide overdue clarity. However, 
Sumption stated his ruling on NOM clauses ‘ma[d]e it unnecessary to deal with 
consideration.’215 He continued that it was undesirable, because the ‘issue was a difficult 
one.’216 Sumption states MWB might have received practical benefits pursuant to Williams, 
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but these benefits are the very thing Foakes prevented.217 He does not expand on this or 
provide any further guidance. He simply notes that Foakes ‘is probably ripe for re-
examination.’218 The Supreme Court did not re-examine Foakes, because it would require a 
larger panel and the decision must be more than obiter.  
Roberts states the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify law.219 This is the first time 
the tension between Williams and Foakes has been put before the Supreme Court.220 Roberts 
is correct to identify the missed opportunity. Any re-examination of Foakes will indeed require 
the Supreme Court. However, it seems unlikely this type of issue will reach the Supreme Court 
soon. It had been 27 years since Williams and Sumption said ‘modern litigation rarely raises 
truly fundamental issues in the law of contract.’ 221 The attempts of the lower courts to 
distinguish from the part-payment rule might encourage appeals; however, in situations 
concerning debt, creditors are unlikely to chase a bad debt and debtors are unlikely to pursue 
litigation given their bad financial circumstances. The Supreme Court could have given some 
guidance.222 Roberts claims despite the discussion being obiter it would be useful for the 
lower courts,223 but Davies considers that any guidance may have created more confusion.224 
However, it is submitted some guidance would have been more constructive than what it 
did.225 Fisher correctly states the Supreme Court has departed from pre-existing law through 
obiter remarks before in Ivey v Genting Casinos.226 Further, in Ivey and R v Jogee, 227 the 
Supreme Court changed the law with a panel of five judges:228 The same as Rock. It was within 
the Court’s capacity to re-examine Foakes, therefore ‘it is odd that it did not decide to sit in 
an enlarged panel’.229 
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The Supreme Court appeared to not overrule the Court of Appeal on the consideration 
point.230 If Foakes was clearly the correct law, Sumption should have overruled Williams. 
Fisher identifies a subtle point. By indicating Foakes is ripe for re-examination, ‘perhaps [it is] 
intimating that it will ultimately side with the preponderance of academic opinion and restore 
coherence by consigning Foakes, rather than [Williams], to legal history.’231 Parliamentary 
intervention could be necessary, since the next case on this issue may take a long time to 
arise. However, the next case to deal with the consideration issue will likely reach the 
Supreme Court rendering Parliamentary intervention unessential. The academic opinion has 
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Chapter 4 
Foakes v Beer232 may well be ripe for re-examination,233 but the fact the Supreme Court did 
not address the part-payment of debt rule in Rock Advertising v MWB Business Exchange 
Centres234 (the Supreme Court hearing is referred to as “Rock”) has reignited the academic 
debate surrounding it. This chapter will consider the position of Foakes, and consequently 
that of Pinnel’s case,235 following the Supreme Court’s remarks on the part-payment rule. The 
arguments both for and against the validity of this rule will be evaluated. These arguments 
will be addressed throughout the following points. First, how Foakes is valid law, but it is not 
necessarily good law. Second, that the law is trying to move forward and that the practical 
benefit rule is the first step to this. Third, that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is often 
overlooked in academic debate, however, it is the most legally valid way future lower courts 
can avoid Foakes. Finally, alternative models of what the law could look like are considered. 
The most suitable will be suggested, alongside the assertion that Foakes should be overruled. 
Foakes Is Not Necessarily Good Law 
Foakes continues to be challenged, albeit indirectly, by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme 
Court in Rock did not resolve the case via the consideration point. Whilst it did throw doubt 
on the reasoning behind it,236 it did not overrule it; therefore, the Court of Appeal decision 
still has some weighting against Foakes. Nevertheless, there is plenty academic support for 
Foakes. Many argue it is still valid law that “should” be followed, but what is required in theory 
does not always follow in practice. Therefore, whilst in theory Foakes should be followed, in 
practice it is not. The main reason it is not adhered to is the practical benefit rule from 
Williams v Roffey Bros.237 Academic support for Foakes depends on critique of Williams. 
Roberts provides that Williams is not secure in the common law landscape, one reason being 
because it has not yet been given ‘a reasoned endorsement in a final court of appeal.’238 Aside 
from a lack of endorsement in the Supreme Court, he refers to the fact the Canadian Supreme 
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Court has not yet spoken of the appropriate place of Williams in the law of Canada. This has 
led to a disparity of views in its jurisdictional provinces.239 The High Court of Australia has not 
considered it in detail either, as well as the Supreme Court of New Zealand; further, the 
Supreme Court of Singapore did discuss the potential role of Williams, but reached no 
conclusion since it was only obiter.240 Until the case of Rock, however, Williams had never 
reached the Supreme Court.241 This could explain why none of the other mentioned final 
courts of appeal have addressed Williams, as Australia, Canada, and Singapore are all 
Commonwealth countries. UK law is very persuasive in their decision-making and they look 
to the UK Supreme Court for guidance. It makes sense, then, why they have not addressed 
Williams: Neither has the UK Supreme Court. Roberts is correct to note, however, that the 
reach of the practical benefit test is unclear. Its extension to situations concerning a part-
payment of debt could not sit alongside Foakes, hence Re Selectmove.242 A part-payment 
cannot be both capable and not capable of consideration. Roberts notes how the lower courts 
in Australia and New Zealand have extended Williams at the earliest opportunity, because 
they believed Foakes could be distinguished or ignored.243 These Commonwealth cases do 
illustrate that the practical benefit rule and part-payment rule are unlikely to sit well together, 
given lower court cases appear to ignore Foakes. This theme is more apparent than ever 
following Rock, since it did not overrule the Court of Appeal’s decision on the consideration 
point. Therefore, arguably the Court of Appeal in MWB Business Exchange Centres v Rock 
Advertising 244  (the Court of Appeal hearing is referred to as MWB) is mirroring the 
Commonwealth courts by ignoring Foakes. However, a subsequent case does not follow suit 
of the Court of Appeal, vouching instead for the validity of Foakes. 
In Simantob v Shavleyan,245 a High Court decision following Rock, Kerr J stated the practical 
benefit rule does not provide consideration in cases involving a part-payment of a debt by 
way of Selectmove. It is a matter of precedent. Williams gave its ruling, which Selectmove 
limited. One Court of Appeal can overrule or limit the ruling of a previous Court of Appeal. 
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Therefore, MWB arguably had some effect on Selectmove, like Selectmove did on Williams. It 
is unclear if this is the case, since it only distinguished from it, but Davies notes how Kerr 
avoids the tension between Selectmove and MWB246 perhaps for this reason. The tension in 
the law remains. Davies argues Kerr’s reiteration of Selectmove was done with reluctance.247 
Kerr, being the first to rule on this area of law since Rock, might have been unsure of the 
standing of MWB. Kerr notes how after the hearing before him, he was only just informed of 
the decision in Rock; 248  whilst he did invite brief written submissions on this, 249  the 
submissions likely assumed the consideration point in MWB bore no relevancy. They did not 
have time to consider the effect the ruling in MWB had on Selectmove. It could be argued 
MWB removes the limits place on Williams by Selectmove. In Simantob, focus was solely on 
the Supreme Court’s ruling, which through its refusal to address the consideration point, 
preserved the current state of the law.250 I would agree with Kerr’s decision that Foakes is still 
the correct approach, however, it is submitted the reasoning in MWB on the consideration 
point stands strong and that the doubt it casts is relevant. The Supreme Court could have 
clarified Foakes, but instead by leaving the reasoning of MWB intact, it hinted it had some 
validity to it. After all, Sumption said Foakes is ‘ripe for re-examination’251 and not Williams. 
This reflects that the law is trying to change but cannot due to Foakes. In other words, Foakes 
is no longer good law, but must be adhered to by way of stare decisis. In accordance with that 
principle, it is no surprise that the methods used in MWB to distinguish from Foakes are 
creative and, unfortunately, as a consequence appear ‘untenable’.252  
Lord Sumption, in Rock, identifies how the rule in Williams is the very thing Foakes provided 
was not adequate consideration. 253  This was the concern of Gibson LJ in Selectmove. If 
Williams or (as Roberts notes)254 MWB is followed, then it is difficult to see when Foakes 
would apply.255 Roberts considers Gibson to be correct and argues the attempts to distinguish 
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from Foakes and Selectmove are ‘untenable’.256 As seen, Arden LJ argues one of the practical 
benefits obtained was ‘avoiding the void’257 of having no licensee. Roberts states that the 
Court of Appeal’s logic means that the ‘promise to release a debt [is] binding if it is given in 
return for practical benefits which have not yet eventuated, but are hoped to arise due to a 
promise of part-payment.’ 258  He makes the following convincing argument. If Foakes is 
problematic because it is better to have the certainty of a small thing than to risk it for 
something greater, i.e., it is better to accept a part-payment than risk receiving it by waiting 
for the whole debt, then it is much less problematic than MWB, which provides it is better to 
have the certainty of a “promised” small thing than to risk it for something greater.259 This 
logic reveals that the law cannot have such two decisions side by side. Roberts explains that 
the law would be incoherent if actually paying a part of a debt is not worthy of consideration, 
but promising to pay part of a debt is. The current uncertainty in the law provides all the 
needed of evidence to support this. Further support comes from Roberts on the way MWB 
distinguished from Foakes and Selectmove. He argues the benefits Arden and Kitchin LJJ 
identify are ‘less distinctive than they appear.’260 The distinction is one without difference to 
Foakes, where Lord Blackburn rejected the practical benefit of receiving more money than 
adhering to the original contract. This would be the case when deciding to accept £50 as 
satisfaction of £100, the creditor receives £50 more than they would otherwise. Roberts 
unravels the blurred nature of the Court of Appeal’s distinction. MWB gained more money 
from the fact they retained a licensee; in other words, they obtained a practical benefit of 
more money.261 Roberts argues this is exactly what Foakes rejected as good consideration.262 
However, gaining more money from retaining a licensee is not payment of a debt. It is likely 
to be received alongside a part-payment, but Roberts combines it with a part-payment itself 
which is not the case. Nevertheless, the obscurity he unravels is indicative of a need for the 
law to evolve. 
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Roberts is supported by Burton. Burton similarly argues the reasons for distinguishing from 
Selectmove are ‘narrow and unconvincing’. 263  The first purported benefit of an upfront 
payment is clearly rejected by Foakes.264 Secondly, keeping a licensee, or in the words of 
Glidewell obviating a disbenefit, 265  was also considered to provide a practical benefit; 
however, Burton argues there was reasonable doubt Rock would have been able to pay future 
payments.266 Therefore, there is no real practical benefit, as MWB would eventually lose a 
licensee. The final purported benefit of recovering some of the arrears, again similar to the 
first benefit, is rejected in Selectmove. Burton and Roberts support one another and clearly 
have a similar train of thought. Roberts also notes how if such benefits were allowed, it would 
be easy to argue a creditor received a practical benefit in most situations. One could simply 
claim, for example, that the agreement to accept a part-payment enhanced the creditor’s 
reputation as a reasonable creditor. Another example, in Selectmove, is that the new 
agreement encouraged other debtors to come forward voluntarily with repayment proposals, 
which meant it increased the Revenue’s efficient use of limited time and resources. Examining 
the practical benefit rule from this perspective shows how it exposes creditors. There is 
always business sense in accepting a smaller payment on a debt, because it is better to receive 
something and retain a licensee/tenant, than to pursue arrears and sue for the outstanding 
amount. Roberts states that on the basis of Williams and MWB there is a low bar to claim 
such a benefit; all a party need do is argue there is some benefit to the creditor over and 
above the part-payment, which essentially can be achieved by rewording the fact that they 
will get more money.267 Yet, equally debtors are significantly exposed because of this rule. A 
creditor could easily accept a part-payment, and with the debtor in a weak position, decide 
to pursue the remaining amount. Clearly, the part-payment rule is unbalanced.  
Fisher follows a logical argument in his support for Foakes. He asserts that Foakes precludes 
Williams, which means Williams is wrongly decided, thus per incuriam and explains why 
Selectmove distinguished from it. Fisher presents three options that a future Supreme Court 
can do to restore clarity to English law. One is to abolish consideration; the other to declare 
contract variations different to contract formations, so they do not require consideration; 
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lastly, they could overrule Williams. It is wrong to think these are the only options available. 
The Supreme Court can depart from its own decision if it appears right to do so. This includes 
Foakes. The above are convincing arguments and it is agreed that the practical benefits found 
in MWB were forced to an extent. Foster and Reilly consider that it must be the case that 
Foakes continues to be followed below the Supreme Court and, for that reason, the Court of 
Appeal in MWB must be considered trumped by Selectmove.268 It is clear in theory that 
Foakes is the law to be followed. Yet, it seldom is in practice. Foster and Reilly indicate that 
the triumph of Selectmove is subject to Foakes being overruled.269 They seem to be suggesting 
it could be overruled in the future. Given its practical notoriety compared to its theoretical 
standing, this is not far-fetched and it is submitted to be desirable. 
The ‘Supreme Court’s failure to clarify the law… will not… end speculation or deter academic 
analysis.’270 From the above arguments, it is abundantly clear that Foakes should be followed. 
It is recognised in Chitty that: 
until the decision in Foakes v Beer is… reversed by the Supreme Court, a promise… to 
accept part-payment… is to be treated as made without consideration, even if the 
creditor gets a practical benefit. In the meantime, its operation is mitigated… at 
common law and in equity.271 
Yet, it is peculiar that a House of Lords decision can be so easily undermined by the Court of 
Appeal in Williams and MWB. The law surrounding Foakes stabilised following the ruling of 
Selectmove, but its stability was rocked again in MWB. One might expect that the Supreme 
Court would clarify and re-assert Foakes, quashing the rebellion of the practical benefit rule. 
But, it did not. It said it is ripe for re-examination.272 Clearly there is something appealing 
about Williams. Perhaps it is a preferred rule to the harshness of Foakes and the lower courts 
think the existing law needs changing. Gibson in Selectmove appears to show sympathy 
towards Williams. Similarly, Blackburn in Foakes showed unease with his ruling, because his 
alternative was ‘not satisfactory to the other noble and learned Lords’.273 It is submitted that 
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whilst Foakes is still valid in theory, its treatment demonstrates it is not good law. Hence, why 
it has little been followed in practice274 irrespective of its binding nature on the lower courts. 
Ignoring Foakes would be, as explored through Roberts, contrary to stare decisis. However, a 
part of stare decisis is distinguishing cases. This is why MWB tried to distinguish in the way it 
did. Whether the benefits found were valid is irrelevant. What matters is that it is a symptom 
that the law is trying to evolve, but it cannot because of Foakes. There are numerous reasons 
for this. 
The Law Is Moving Forward 
With the critique in chapter 2 in mind, it is obvious then why MWB sought to distinguish from 
Foakes. Perhaps the lower courts are trying to encourage litigants to appeal to the Supreme 
Court by distinguishing.275 They are indirectly suggesting to the Supreme Court Foakes needs 
overruling. Gibson in Selectmove recognises it may need reconsidering, despite following it.276 
Nevertheless, as Roberts correctly states, in line with stare decisis, until the Supreme Court 
actually overturns or substantially modifies Foakes, the lower courts are bound to follow it.277 
Undoubtedly, like in MWB, the lower courts will continue to find ways to distinguish it. This is 
in accordance with stare decisis. Arden and Kitchin have been promoted to the Supreme 
Court; Roberts speculates they may now make attempts to overturn Foakes. 278  Whilst 
‘modern litigation rarely raises truly fundamental issues in the law of contract’, the awaited 
discussion and likely overruling of Foakes is on the horizon.  
Williams and MWB are attempts to move the law away from the harshness of Foakes. In 
addition to the chapter 2 arguments against Foakes, Shaw-Mellors and Poole argue English 
law develops inadequate principles in relation to the renegotiation of contracts. For example, 
they argue ‘the relationship between consideration and duress in the context of [variation] 
promises… is far from clear.’279 These unclear principles are created, because of the law’s 
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response to the enforceability of contracts that were varied due to dramatic circumstances.280 
Such circumstances might be an economic recession, or a sub-contractor no longer being able 
to meet a performance deadline, as was the case in Williams. 281 A point of interest are 
economic recessions. The law’s response to contracts changed because of this event is argued 
to be inadequate, but I take this one step further. The law’s response to variation contracts 
has been influenced by economic recessions, whether or not the contract was changed 
because of such circumstances. Consider the year of Foakes. In 1884, the UK was still in a 
period of depression and economic turmoil. It was decided 11 years after the Panic of 1873 
financial crisis. 282  During economic recession, one way to stimulate economic activity is 
through the borrowing of money. It seems likely, therefore, that a legal decision affecting 
creditors and consequently the economy, would be decided in a manner that encourages 
them to lend.  The part-payment rule ensures they will lend, as they do not stand to lose 
anything upon accepting a smaller repayment. Whilst this was not the only influence on the 
House of Lords in Foakes, it is likely the economic climate factored into favouring the decision 
of Pinnel’s Case.283 It might explain too how they oversaw Hughes v Metropolitan Railway 
Co.284  
The Overlooked Doctrine 
Following Rock, there is some consensus that the application of Williams to part-payment of 
debt situations is wrong. Doing so would result in forced arguments of distinction. The 
academics against accepting Williams argue it would mean abandoning Foakes. 285 
Interestingly, Foster and Reilly argue this would also mean abandoning ‘the exceptions to it 
created by promissory estoppel.’286 Clearly, there are other ways to avoid the harshness of 
the rule in Foakes, but it is an overlooked aspect in academic debate. Indeed, the primary 
focus of the debate is the relationship between Williams as an exception to Foakes, but the 
real purpose of the debate is the practicality of Foakes. It may be interesting to debate how 
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Williams does, or does not, sit well with Foakes, but the central issue is should it be departing 
from this House of Lords decision and will the law work. The real overlooked purpose of the 
debate is to uncover how the law can move on from the part-payment rule. In Collier v 
Wright,287 Arden states how ‘the doctrine of promissory estoppel… was developed to meet 
the hardship created by the rule in Pinnel’s case.’288 She made it clear that it can be used in 
situations of part-payment as a defence: ‘promissory estoppel has the effect of extinguishing 
the creditor's right to… the debt.’289 This appears to render Foakes inapplicable, but other 
cases state it merely suspends such rights290 and it was submitted in chapter 2 these cases 
are correct. Collier was unusual in that it applied both Pinnel’s and promissory estoppel. No 
consideration was found, but estoppel could be relied upon. Despite its cautionary treatment, 
it demonstrates promissory estoppel can be used as an exception to Foakes. 
MWB, in seeking to distinguish from Foakes, ironically curtails the attempts of promissory 
estoppel to achieve a similar thing. Burton argues MWB reignited the debate around the 
prerequisite of a detriment.291 He submits it ‘has taken the wind of the sails of… High Trees, 
leaving it in a state of limited application.’ 292 This is because if there was a detrimental 
reliance, i.e. taking on extra obligations, there would be no need to consider Foakes. But, as 
Burton notes, these conclusions are obiter and it is unclear if the Court of Appeal was 
unanimous on this.293 It is submitted the requirement of a detriment would provide some 
protection to creditors, as it limits the situations where the defence can apply to those where 
the debtor suffers a detriment. However, it is hard to conceptualise when the debtor would 
not be putting themselves at a detriment. Much of what this doctrine could cover, Arzandeh 
and McVea argue is more easily covered by the practical benefit rule.294 For now, however, 
promissory estoppel is the best answer the law has to avoiding Foakes without resorting to a 
forced application of Williams, especially since its usage remains unclear. Collins convincingly 
                                                          
287 Collier (n 42). 
288 Ibid 655. 
289 Ibid 659 at 42. 
290 Tool Metal (n 18). 
291 Burton (n 93) 9. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid, 10 
294 A Arzandeh and H McVea, ‘Refining Consideration: RIP Foakes v Beer?’ (2017) 1 Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 7, 12 (RIP Foakes). 
40  
states ‘what appears clear is that [Foakes] is no longer inviolate, and promissory estoppel… 
offer[s] a significant counterweight’.295 
Alternative Models 
It is clear the law is trying to move away from Foakes, but what is not so clear is what it is 
striving to. The earlier arguments of Roberts explored the treatment of Williams and Foakes 
in Commonwealth countries. Although concluding in favour of Foakes in English law, he notes:  
there is… a wide divergence of views between the Canadian provinces. The positions 
range from upholding the pre-existing duty rule for variations as it stood prior to 
Roffey… to doing away with the requirement for consideration for variation contracts 
entirely.296  
The Canadian Court of Appeal in British Columbia followed the latter, more radical approach. 
The remainder of this chapter will explore this alternative model and another that the law 
should use to replace Foakes. 
The Radical Model 
The Court of Appeal’s radical approach was taken in Rosas v Toca.297 Rosas won the lottery 
and loaned Toca $600,000. Rosas requested they pay it back after one year. When that time 
came, Toca said they can pay it back the next year and Rosas agreed to not file a claim. This 
request for a deferred payment by Toca repeated for several years and eventually Rosas 
claimed. At first instance, it was held the promise to repay was unenforceable, due to a lack 
of consideration, and because the original loan term expired thus the claim was statute 
barred. However, Rosas’ appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal stated Williams shows 
‘support for an evolution in the law’.298 The scenario in Rosas is of course different to the one 
explored here, since no part-payment was made. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal modified 
what was required in the variation of contracts: ‘the variation should be enforceable without 
fresh consideration, absent duress, unconscionability, or other public policy concerns’.299 It is 
unlikely English law will do away with consideration, hence the case’s radical nature. 
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Consideration is what makes it unique. But there are parallels between this remark and the 
English common law. It is submitted it reflects the model I argue the law should take. 
An Alterative 
Debtors should have two avenues of protection to avoid being taken advantage of when 
paying a lower amount as satisfaction of a debt. Both ways, however, should be subject to a 
proviso that equally protects creditor from also being taken advantage of. The first avenue is 
that consideration can be found if there is a practical benefit. This entails extending Williams 
to part-payment situations. Shaw-Mellors and Poole think Williams is a two-way process. The 
first question to be asked should be is there any sign of economic duress, like in Rosas; if not, 
then steps should be taken to identify practical benefit(s) for consideration. 300  The 
requirement for economic duress is the proviso. This protects both parties and ensures a fair 
outcome. If a debtor tries to coerce a creditor into accepting less, the creditor is protected by 
duress; on the other hand, if a creditor knows a debtor can only pay so much and accepts this, 
but tries to pursue the rest subsequently, the debtor is also protected. The practical benefit 
rule is not unfair on the creditor, because they can still pursue the standard procedure of filing 
a claim or charging arrears. The preferred option of accepting less, which arguably makes 
commercial sense, is still available but can no longer be exploited. The law is nearly in this 
position. Clarification of what constitutes a practical benefit is needed. The test is too 
vague,301 hence the conflict between Selectmove and MWB. Williams may be able to sit next 
to Foakes as an exception, like Arden argued. However, Foakes no doubt would apply in only 
limited circumstances. It may only apply ‘where there is no evidence of consideration over 
and above that of simply accommodating the debtor.’ 302 It might be desirable of future 
Supreme Court justices to preserve it out of respect for Coke, but nevertheless the rule is a 
harsh one and this clarification of the practical benefit rule might condemn Foakes to 
irrelevancy.303 The alternative is to depart from Foakes, because it seems right. Foakes may 
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have been per incuriam, via overlooking Hughes.304 It is submitted it should be overruled. It 
is the better option than to render it irrelevant through neglect305 and not clarify the law.  
The second avenue for debtors is promissory estoppel. Its current use already enhances the 
irrelevancy of Foakes. The small margin of situations not covered by Williams would be swept 
up by this doctrine. This only serves to strengthen the case for overruling Foakes, as more 
than one aspect of the law conflicts with it. Promissory estoppel may sweep up the remains, 
but creditors should still have a protection. By insisting on the prerequisite of a detriment, 
this serves to balance the law. A debtor could not simply claim this defence, because they 
relied on the fact the creditor said they would accept less. They must have suffered a 
detriment. Clarity would exist for judges, who could decide on a balance of facts. Faced with 
a part-payment situation, a judge can determine if there is a practical benefit obtained by the 
creditor absent of economic duress. If there is no benefit, they can look to promissory 
estoppel and apply the defence assuming a detriment exists. It gives them, and the law, space 
to breath. The practical benefit rule is the sword to the shield of promissory estoppel. 
A future Supreme Court reaching any decision will be difficult, as Lord Sumption says it is ‘truly 
a fundamental issue’.306 Chief Justice Bauman, of British Columbia’s highest court, stated:  
It has been famously said that “hard cases make bad law”; sometimes, however, hard 
cases make new law. Or, at least, they very much encourage the court to do so lest we 
give credence to Mr. Bumble’s lament in Oliver Twist: “If the law supposes that…the 
law is a ass”.307 
Sumption’s indication that Foakes is ripe for re-examination, as seen in chapter 3, is 
‘intimating that [the Supreme Court] will ultimately side with the preponderance of academic 
opinion and restore coherence by consigning Foakes, rather than [Williams], to legal 
history.’308 Nevertheless, when the issue next reaches the Supreme Court, the case will be a 
hard one. The overruling of a principle that has existed since 1602 will no doubt be difficult, 
but it cannot come soon enough. 
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Chapter 5 
Much of the focus throughout this piece has been on the part-payment of debt rule and how 
promissory estoppel relates to it. In Rock Advertising v MWB Business Exchange Centres,309 
however, Lord Sumption said the case raised two fundamental issues of contract law.310 The 
other is that of No Oral Modification (“NOM”) clauses. This is a term that specifies an 
agreement cannot be amended orally and usually can only be amended if it is done in writing. 
It was unclear if NOM clauses were legally effective if parties had orally agreed to vary the 
contract contrary to it, because of the principle of party autonomy. Further, it was unclear 
what bearing promissory estoppel had on the validity of such clauses. It was seen in chapter 
3, that the Supreme Court held NOM clauses to be legally effective where the parties tried to 
orally vary a contract. However, some degree of ambiguity remained in situations where 
parties orally agreed to dispense of the NOM clause. Sumption said they could not; Lord Briggs 
stated obiter that the parties could potentially dispense of a NOM clause orally but, like 
Sumption stated, they cannot orally vary the contract in any other way. The law is settled 
nonetheless, as Briggs’ view was only obiter. But this has not prevented academic debate over 
which perspective is to be preferred. Despite the clarity, there may be a possibility that the 
lower courts adopt Briggs’ obiter. The academic debate also rages against the Supreme Court 
ruling, although it is little in volume.  
Little Critique of NOM Clauses 
Those against the legal effectiveness of NOM clauses cite party autonomy. This argument was 
dispelled in the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, academics and practitioners have raised other 
arguments against NOM clauses. Calnan argues NOM clauses are disadvantageous, because 
it can allow a party to escape an oral variation since it does not comply with the underlying 
contract.311 He continues that a fundamental part of English law is that effect is given to 
agreements with consideration.312 Therefore, it cannot be assumed NOM clauses will work in 
every situation, because such formalities will eventually lead to problems as in the case of 
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Actionstrength v International Glass Engineering. 313  However, Calnan does recognise 
estoppel helps mitigate this situation. Calnan also argues there will still be a great deal of 
pressure on the courts to enforce oral variations, where parties have agreed and acted upon 
an oral variation: Rock welcomes litigation as opposed to welcoming certainty.314 However, 
this dissertation contends the alternative is equally likely to welcome litigation. The whole 
purpose of NOM clauses is to prevent false assertions of oral variations. Rock is a perfect 
example of this. Parties are equally likely to litigate over alleged oral variations of a contract, 
rather than just the fact a party went back on an oral variation. NOM clauses instead introduce 
certainty. Parties now know they cannot orally vary the contract where such clauses exist. 
Instead the cause for future litigation is not NOM clauses, it is the chance of promissory 
estoppel. Consider a situation similar to Rock. If the parties, whose contract contains a NOM 
clause, orally agree to a lower payment of a debt and the creditor goes back on this promise 
and demands the full debt, under the Supreme Court ruling the debtor is unlikely to succeed 
in a claim. Notwithstanding that there may be consideration under the practical benefit rule, 
they know this because of the certainty of NOM clauses. However, they could refuse to pay 
the remaining debt, in which case the creditor will likely sue. In these circumstances, the 
debtor can now rely on promissory estoppel. This is not certain however, because the 
applicability of promissory estoppel in the context of NOM clauses remains vague.315 
Waal argues the ‘certainty [of a NOM clause] would [mean] certain injustice’.316 He states 
that ‘the [Court of Appeal] decision reflects the flexibility of the common law and is to be 
applauded.’317 It can be said Waal’s thinking mirrors the Court of Appeal’s, because he does 
not give his own reasons against the legal effectiveness of NOM clauses. Whilst this does not 
detract from his assertion, his view is subject to the same criticisms on the Court of Appeal. 
The main problem with its ruling is that it did not translate to practice. Many practitioners still 
recommended the use of NOM clauses. Some recognised that NOM clauses still had obvious 
benefits, as it encourages parties to have a written record of changes to a contract and this 
helps ‘avoid future disputes about any subsequent variations.’ 318  Using NOM clauses is 
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regarded ‘as a matter of good practice’. 319  They are also more in line with how the 
construction industry traditionally operates, according to legal experts in that sector. 320 
Mather states the Court of Appeal ruling was useful for property lawyers, as property-related 
contracts can be altered orally, but the decision increased the prospect of false or frivolous 
claims of oral variations.321 This is dangerous given the ‘widespread use [of NOM clauses] in 
commercial practice’.322 Clearly its commercial use is desirable, because it will help avoid 
litigation on allegations of oral variations. Rock is an example contrary to this, but this case 
resolved the issue. Moving forward it is apparent that future attempts to litigate over NOM 
clauses will be heavily discouraged, unless one party can vouch for promissory estoppel, in 
which case they may deliberately hope a claim arises to rely on the defence as discussed. 
Many considered that the Court of Appeal stance ‘cause[d] a great deal of consternation in 
commercial circles.’323 Foster and Reilly also argued great confusion would persist in the 
commercial world, if parties could abandon the express terms of a contract by merely 
agreeing to the contrary. 324 Purkis and Callaway, however, correctly recognised that the 
Supreme Court has now laid to rest the confusion created by the Court of Appeal.325 Evidently, 
the critique of NOM clauses is heavily outweighed by practical considerations. 326  The 
arguments in favour of such clauses are more convincing and greater in number. 
The Supreme Court Is Right 
Before the Supreme Court case, Morgan recognised the error the Court of Appeal made.327 
His arguments were convincing enough for Sumption to cite in his judgment. 328 Morgan 
argued the controversy of formality requirements subsides when ‘the parties tie their own 
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hands.’329 He likened NOM clauses to a dilemma presented to Ulysses’ crew.330 Having tied 
their captain to the ship before sailing past an island, the captain urgently wished to be untied. 
However, earlier the captain had told them to ignore his later wishes to be released. 
‘[C]onctracting parties may sensibly wish to limit their later freedom and insert a term 
requiring the court to enforce that restraint.’ 331  Not enforcing NOM clauses would be 
inconsistent with other formality rules like entire agreement clauses,332 therefore, it suggests 
the Court of Appeal decision against the effectiveness of NOM clauses erred. Morgan 
continues that the fact English does not usually require formalities for contractual variations 
is irrelevant. If parties want to depart from the default position of the law and make variations 
more onerous, then so be it; they have demonstrated the unsuitability of the law for their 
situation.333 In addition, Morgan argues it is difficult to see how it can be reasonable to rely 
on an informal variation when parties have agreed to a NOM clause. 334  It is clear from 
Christou’s Boilerplate: Practical Clauses,335 that the rationale of NOM clauses is to prevent 
variations being made informally or by accident.336 Parties who do not want their relationship 
to be governed by contractual agreements, Morgan argues, should simply not include NOM 
clauses. 337  The only exception to this are consumers and potentially less sophisticated 
commercial parties, who can override NOM clauses via unfair terms legislation. 338  Big 
commercial players should be held to their word, as preventing an oral variation where a 
NOM clause exists beneficially extends freedom of contract.339  
Morgan’s view, which influenced Sumption, makes sense. A true argument of freedom of 
contract would not validate oral variations, it would instead see that the parties initially 
agreed to bind themselves in a particular way.  Like Ulysses’ crew, at the time of the initial 
agreement the parties had reason to bind their future conduct. For whatever reason held to 
them, they considered oral variations to be undesirable. A change in circumstances might 
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make them overlook this, like it did for the captain. It is the role of the courts to enforce what 
the parties’ original clear intentions are. Subsequent oral variations could later be distasteful 
to the parties. If the variation was truly desirable by the parties, then they would seek to 
follow the formalities prescribed in the NOM clause. It could be argued they would not if the 
desired variation was minimal, but the formalities to follow were onerous. Onerous 
formalities are rare however. Yet, Briggs’ approach would allow the possibility of defeating 
NOM clauses. Understandably some parties might overlook the clause, however, as Morgan 
states these situations should not receive sympathy for big commercial players. Other users 
of NOM clauses might receive sympathy via unfair terms legislation. Another avenue 
potentially available is the defence of promissory estoppel. This provides insight on Briggs’ 
approach. Perhaps the enforceability of NOM clauses should depend on its users, when they 
know and orally agree to dispense of the clause. Big commercial players should be held to the 
clause, but it could be reasonable to think smaller commercial parties might believe they can 
orally dispense of the NOM clause and subsequently act on their variation. They might 
operate on the assumption that they can change their contract in any way they want, because 
it is their contract. To enforce otherwise would inhibit their commercial practice. However, 
the disadvantage of requiring parties to comply with a minor formality requiring variations to 
be in writing, is better than the disadvantage of false allegations of oral variations and the 
uncertainty surrounding the contractual document. If a dispute did arise, clear evidential 
barriers exist as to the actual state of the contract since variations were not recorded in 
writing. 
Sumption’s reasoning was also influenced by McKendrick, who discusses the Vienna 
Convention340 and the UNIDROIT principles,341 which Sumption refers to in his judgment.342 
McKendrick states these international laws offer a better balance of the parties’ interests than 
the Court of Appeal judgment, since it gave too little weight to NOM clauses.343 All that would 
be required to effect an oral variation under the Court of Appeal ruling is proof on a balance 
of probabilities that the agreement was made and it was intended to be binding.344 However, 
it has been seen that NOM clauses are undoubtedly the preferred option. The crucial issue 
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that McKendrick recognised even before the Supreme Court ruling, is what are the steps 
parties can take to depart from NOM clauses.345 Logically, one step is to depart in writing, as 
there would be no inconsistency with the NOM clause.346 This is what Sumption finds.347 
Whether or not the parties can agree orally to depart from a NOM clause is one of the issues 
that separates Sumption and Briggs.348 
Departing from NOM Clauses 
In addition to departing from NOM clauses in writing, McKendrick presents two alternatives. 
One entails parties orally dispensing of the NOM clause and they expressly addressed its 
existence. The other scenario is where parties enter into an oral variation without knowledge 
of it, but this is analysed under the next heading concerning promissory estoppel. Although 
he notes dispensing of a NOM clause orally is inconsistent with the clause itself, he states it 
can be argued that effect should be given to it assuming the parties expressly addressed it is 
there and have agreed to delete it.349 Of course, this is contrary to what Sumption stated thus 
arguably contrary to the law. But there is the obiter of Briggs of which Harris supports strongly 
for similar reasons to McKendrick. Harris argues doing away with NOM clauses orally is the 
more cautious and desirable approach, as it ensures a balance between the parties.350 It also 
preserves party autonomy as it allows parties to release themselves from the inhibition.351 
Harris considers that Sumption’s view would ‘amount to an absurd restriction of party 
autonomy’, especially since the directors of the contracting parties often change.352 However, 
if the directors often change, then it would be better to keep a written record. This way the 
future directors of the business would know when, and perhaps why, the NOM clause was 
dispensed with. Not only does this introduce certainty within businesses, but it may have 
been the intention of the original directors. This method upholds party autonomy for the old 
directors and the new ones of each party. The claim that Sumption’s view leads to an absurd 
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restriction rests on Harris’ argument in relation to onerous conditions. He questions what the 
courts would do when faced with more stringent requirements under a NOM clause.353 Some 
stringent requirements could be mitigated by public policy considerations, if for example a 
variation was required to be signed in blood.354 However, some might require extremely 
difficult formalities; Harris gives the examples of signing the variation on top of Mount 
Snowdon, that it be approved by 95 per cent of the parties’ shareholders, or that it must be 
signed on goatskin vellum. 355  Nothing could mitigate these requirements, therefore 
Sumption’s view is only persuasive if the formalities required are to be in writing and signed; 
any other formalities rendered his perspective defective, according to Harris.356 There are 
issues with this argument. 
The examples given are indeed onerous, and even if the original directors had good reason 
for including them, it would be unreasonable to expect any new directors to follow them too. 
Departing from it would be extremely difficult and it would greatly inhibit freedom of 
contract. However, it is unusual for businesses to require such formalities other than for it to 
be in writing and signed by both parties. This aspect dominates contractual agreements in 
both formation and variation.357 Harris openly admits Sumption’s view would work if not for 
the onerous conditions that can exist. The better approach for the law then is not to side with 
Briggs, but instead to adopt a proviso that allows the departure from NOM clauses where its 
conditions are clearly, and objectively, onerous. This upholds the flexibility of NOM clauses, 
because the courts can decide on a factual basis what conditions are and are not onerous. It 
allows the courts to give effect to the genuine and sensible intentions of the parties by 
assessing what makes business sense. Calnan also recognises that more elaborate conditions, 
other than the simple one that variations must be in writing and signed, are likely to cause 
more problems than it solves.358 A court, therefore, should be able to find that a NOM clause 
can be departed from orally if the written conditions are onerous. Contrary to Harris’ critique, 
Sumption actually recognises this. He states recording a variation in writing is not difficult, 
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except ‘in cases where the variation is so complex that no sensible businessman would do 
anything else.’ 359  Sumption’s approach is best, as Reid-Thomas and Myles recognise the 
safest approach is to record variations in writing.360  
However, it arguably needs clarifying that parties can depart orally if the written conditions 
are onerous, since Sumption recognised the need for this but did not elaborate on it. That 
does not merit departing from the current position of the law and siding with Briggs as Harris 
would suggest. Future lower courts are likely to recognise this in Sumption’s judgment. The 
proviso set out is not the current law, as Sumption did not elaborate on this point: Hence the 
academic debate. Future courts will perhaps use Briggs’ obiter to refine the law as suggested. 
When adopting his obiter however, it is submitted that they should emphasise that NOM 
clauses can only be departed from orally where the conditions are onerous. This keeps the 
law in line with Sumption’s reasoning and avoids re-introducing ambiguity. However, Starr 
argues this is the final word on NOM clauses.361 Even if the courts decide against this and 
choose to assert NOM clauses with onerous conditions, the law is better off this way since it 
reaffirms the certainty of them. After all, Sumption states party autonomy justifies them.362 
Instead, in these onerous circumstances, parties could rely on promissory estoppel. 
Thompson captures the crux of the debate. She states that contractual certainty is desirable, 
but so is a world where oral promises given for consideration cannot be avoided.363 It is very 
common for parties to agree to minor variations ‘to oil the wheels of commerce’.364 But, 
ultimately she notes that where two principles collide, certainty will win unless there are rare 
grounds for estoppel.365 It is submitted any reaffirmation of NOM clauses, or polishing of it to 
allow departure in face of onerous conditions, upholds certainty. This is why NOM clauses 
prevailed. 
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It has been seen that NOM clauses can only be removed in writing. However, where parties 
expressly address its onerous existence, there is scope for it to be removed orally. These are 
two of the situations in which a NOM clause may be removed. The other concerns where 
parties make an oral variation unaware of a NOM clause. In this instance, McKendrick argues 
the NOM clause still applies, because the parties have not exercised their contractual 
freedoms to remove it.366 Merely acting inconsistently with their contract is not enough to 
remove the NOM clause agreed to. 367  However, McKendrick notes that in some 
circumstances the parties reliance on the non-compliant oral variation should be legally 
effective in spite of the NOM clause. ‘To refuse to do so would give rise to an unacceptable 
degree of unfairness’.368 Whilst reliance on estoppel may generate uncertainty, he states 
there is a balance to be struck between the competing policies of NOM clauses and 
estoppel. 369  Although McKendrick does not refer to a specific estoppel, it is submitted 
promissory estoppel is the most appropriate; further, it is presumed Sumption is referring to 
promissory estoppel or estoppel by conduct.370 McKendrick argues the balance struck under 
the Vienna Convention and UNIDROIT principles is optimal, as it is designed with limits that 
give effect to parties’ reliance on their non-compliant variation. 371  However, whether 
promissory estoppel could prevent resorting to a NOM clause was left open by the Supreme 
Court,372 despite Sumption following what McKendrick states on international law. Sumption 
only made reference to Actionstrength and its stipulations. 
In Actionstrength, Actionstrength agreed to do work for the first defendant Inglen. When 
Inglen started to make late payments, Actionstrength threatened to remove its workforce. 
However, the second defendant, St-Gobain, promised them if they did not remove their 
workforce, they would ensure Inglen paid the amount due. This agreement was made orally 
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and invoked the Statute of Frauds 1677, which required any such variations to be made in 
writing. For that reason, the House of Lords held estoppel could not be raised, unless two 
circumstances persisted. The first was that St-Gobain must have been led by the words or 
conduct of Actionstrength that the promise would be honoured; secondly, ‘there must be 
something more, such as additional encouragement, inducement or assurance.’ 373  This 
mirrors the typical requirements for promissory estoppel, but it beats around the bush on the 
need for a detriment. The circumstances they detail seem to indicate the defence succeeds if 
the relying party was deceived. The requirement for the promise to be believed to be 
honoured, and for something more like an encouragement, suggests a deliberate attempt by 
the other party to entice an agreement but to later go against it. St Gobain, however, had 
done nothing which would foster either of these things.374 
Morgan argues the courts should be cautious of estoppel, as its full acceptance would mean 
many informal variations would be enforced. 375  He notes in particular how relying on 
estoppel through analogy of the Actionstrength case should fail, as in that case its use would 
have been contrary to what was required in statute, therefore the same would be contrary to 
NOM clauses.376 Morgan notes if estoppel was allowed in a generous manner, many drafters 
would try to prevent any variation via estoppel.377 It is key then, as Sumption says, that ‘the 
scope of estoppel cannot be so broad as to destroy the whole advantage of [the] certainty 
[that comes with NOM clauses.]’378 However, the concern over estoppel might be for naught. 
Future cases concerning NOM clauses and alleged oral variations will likely contain one party 
that was severely disadvantaged by relying on the oral variation, whereas the other party’s 
position would be relatively intact. It follows that the disadvantaged party will most often be 
the one filing a claim. Assuming most cases pertain to this example, the party who is 
disadvantaged, due to their reliance on the oral variation, cannot rely on promissory estoppel 
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for the very fact that they are the one filing a claim. Promissory estoppel can only be used as 
a defence.379 To get rid of this aspect, is to get rid of the doctrine of consideration. 
It seems promissory estoppel will remain as a safeguard according to Purkis and Callaway.380 
This is a sensible perspective. They argue there will still be circumstances where English law 
recognises the commercial need to make decisions quickly and will therefore provide 
protections via estoppel; however, only if there is the requisite degree of reliance.381 The 
ramifications estoppel could have on NOM clauses undermines it significantly, hence why 
many treat estoppel with caution. Sumption’s reference to Actionstrength is unsatisfactory. 
Harris is correct to state his using of it as a safety valve is unsatisfactory, because it is difficult 
to see what might suffice for his borrowing of ‘something more’382 from Actionstrength. What 
is required for estoppel to trump a NOM clause needs clarification. The first point from 
Actionstrength is a good start, as it pertains to the principle of party autonomy. Sumption 
leaves the second point wide open. It is submitted, to fill the gap, clarity is required on what 
degree of reliance is needed. As argued in chapter 4, the doctrine should require the promisee 
suffers a detriment. Actionstrength appears to allude to this requirement, but whether or not 
it is a definitive requirement is obscure. It is not surprising its effect on NOM clauses is 
ambiguous: The doctrine itself is filled with ambiguity. Clarity on promissory estoppel is 
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Conclusion 
Rock Advertising v MWB Business Exchange Centres383 considerably doubts Foakes v Beer.384 
It was appropriate for it to do so, as clearly there are fundamental issues in the part-payment 
of debt rule. The Supreme Court felt it was unnecessary and undesirable to deal with Foakes, 
unless it is before an enlarged panel and the decision would be more than obiter. Deciphering 
the conflicting aspects of the law reveals it is moving away from Foakes and will settle instead 
on the practical benefit rule. For Foakes to have any future application, the practical benefit 
rule would have to be overruled, as it is used too often to distinguish from it and Re 
Selectmove.385 It would have been easy for the Supreme Court to overrule the practical 
benefit rule and the doubt it places on Foakes, but it did not. Clearly, the overruling of Foakes 
is preferable. The Supreme Court, understandably, was not comfortable with taking a decision 
to overrule Foakes when it would only have been obiter. Perhaps the law is not ready to move 
on, after all common law decisions seem to be affected by economic considerations and the 
last recession was in 2008. In the eyes of the law, this is not that far away considering only 10 
years had passed since economic crisis in Foakes. In Rock, only 10 years had passed too. 
However, since Arden and Kitchin LJJ were promoted to Supreme Court judges, the overruling 
of Foakes appears inevitable.386 The next time a case reaches the Supreme Court, with the 
central issue being a part-payment of a debt, Foakes will either be substantially modified and 
limited or overruled. It is only a matter of when, but the latter is preferred. 
Want for the practical benefit rule is evident throughout the law. The concerns of Lord 
Blackburn and the obiter of Denning are prime examples.387 Preference for something other 
than the part-payment rule was apparent before Foakes in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway 
Co.388 Further, Denning stated the fusion of law and equity existed before Foakes.389 Whilst 
the concept of ruling on equity was relatively new to the judges in Foakes, since its fusion only 
came about 10 years earlier in the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875, Denning 
suggests if equity was considered in Foakes it would have been decided differently and more 
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akin to Hughes.390 Perhaps Denning is right to hint that Foakes was per incuriam through 
oversight of Hughes, but this is mitigated by the fact that the cases had two of the same 
judges. 391  Further, Hughes concerned house repairs and not debts. Foakes might have 
enshrined the part-payment rule in the law due to its the economic desirability at the time. A 
court ruling favouring debtors in a time of economic recession is unlikely. It could never be 
challenged directly afterwards, because debtors would be extremely unwilling to go to the 
Supreme Court, given they are already in bad financial circumstances. Foakes only served to 
discourage them further. Hence, the law has seen several indirect attempts of the lower 
courts to cast doubt or distinguish from it.392 
Foakes’ replacement needs to be much more tenable. Foakes should be overruled and 
contract variations should be valid through the practical benefit rule. To achieve this stability, 
the courts must balance the interests of debtors and creditors. Debtors should be able to 
resort to the practical benefit rule, but protection from exploitation will exist for creditors via 
economic duress. For debtors not rich enough to pursue a (counter-)claim, the courts must 
provide an extra layer of protection through promissory estoppel. However, to ensure it is 
not exploited against creditors too, they should assert the need for a detriment that results 
in inequitable circumstances. They must allow the lower courts room to breathe, by stressing 
the factual dependency of what constitutes such a detriment and inequity. A future Supreme 
Court should clarify the practical benefit rule and promissory estoppel would protect debtors 
and the exploitation of these principles is mitigated by economic duress and the need for a 
detrimental inequity. The practical benefit rule is the much-needed sword to the shield of 
promissory estoppel. 
Clarity should not stop here. Promissory estoppel and its place next to NOM clauses requires 
clarification. Academic debate might exist over which approach is to be preferred, but Briggs’ 
perspective was only obiter and Sumption’s view is the law.393 There is scope for NOM clauses 
to be removed orally if its formalities are onerous. He leaves the scope of promissory estoppel 
unclear. However, by saying it should not be so wide as to destroy the certainty of NOM 
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clauses,394 he paves the way for future cases to explore the circumstances in which estoppel 
can be relied upon.395 However, this is likely the last we will hear from the Supreme Court on 
NOM clauses396 and, at least for a long time, on the part-payment rule too. With any luck a 
future case might be paired with both issues, but it would be one where the consideration 
point formed the central matter of the case. Then, the Supreme Court can finally resolve the 
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